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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Shippers' Advisory Boards and Their Forecasts
AT THE BEGINNING of the third quarter of 1927 the Car Service
Division of the American Railroad Association issued a forecast of
the number of freight cars shippers would require in that quarter.
It has published similar forecasts ever since. These documents com-
prise by far the most extensive record we have of efforts to antici-
pate the movement of freight traffic. (Indeed, it would be hard to
find another economic activity which has been the subject of con-
tinuous forecasts over so long a period.) Most of this paper will
therefore be devoted to these forecasts.
In a sense the forecasts originated in the severe shortages of
freight cars that frequently occurred in the early 1920's. It was felt
that the situation called for organized interchange of information
about needs for and the supply of cars between shippers and rep-
resentatives of the railroads. Beginning in 1923, regional Shippers'
Advisory Boards were formed in various parts of the country under
the auspices of the Car Service Division. They met regularly and
set up commodity committees to deal with particular species of
traffic. By the middle of 1927 each committee was making a formal
estimate of the number of cars that would be needed for the load-
ing of its kind of traffic in its region, and the estimates were con-
sidered sufficiently standardized to justify the issuance of national
totals. The committee estimates are assembled and published by the
Division in a release called the National Forecast. Issued near the
beginning of each quarter, it shows for each of thirty-two (orig-
inally twenty-seven) classes of commodities the actual carloadings
in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, the estimated
carloadings for the quarter, and the percentage increase or decrease
of the latter over the former. The information is given for the coun-
try as a whole and for each of thirteen regions.
These estimates apply to shipments tendered to the railroads in
carload quantities. They include only the more important kinds of
carload traffic. In 1949, for example, the actual carloadings of the
William I. Greenwald and Johanna Stern assisted the author in preparing
this paper.
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commodities included in the forecast were 91 per cent of the num-
ber of carloads reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission as
originated, and 87 per cent of all carloadings except merchandise
given by the Car Service Division in its weekly release on car-
loadings reported to it by railroads. Merchandise is traffic tendered
by shippers in less than carload quantities; railroads, not shippers,
usually load it into cars. The actual carloadings reported by the
Shippers' Advisory Boards were 76 per cent of all carloadings in,-
eluding
Estimated versus Actual Carloadings
Perhaps the simplest way to measure the accuracy of these fore-
casts is to compute the percentage ratio of the estimated loadings
for each quarter to the actual loadings in the same quarter. This
can be done, at the moment of writing, for ninety-nine forecasts, of
which the earliest pertains to the third quarter of 1927, and the
last to the first quarter of 1952.2 The accuracy of the overall national
estimate for all commodities forecast has varied a great deal (chart
1). The error has ranged from an overstatement of 40.5 per cent
in the second quarter of 1932 to an understatement of 14.7 per cent
in the third quarter of 1933.
What was the average error? There are two ways of answering
this question. To a person who uses a forecast as a guide to action,
an error in one direction may not compensate for a previous error
in the opposite direction. Since one error does not atone for the
other, from his point of view we should ignore signs when we corn-
We have computed these percentages from data in the four 1950 issues of
the National Forecast, Interstate Commerce Commission Statistics of Railways
for 1949, and the Car Service Division statement on Revenue Freight Loaded
for the week ending December 31, 1949.
2Sincethe traffic covered by the estimates is less inclusive than that re-
ported in other sources, it is difficult to obtain an actual figure, comparable with
the forecast, except from the following year's forecast. Otherwise it would be
possible at present to appraise four additional quarterly forecasts.
During the war some traffic was omitted and other traffic added to the fore-
casts, as follows:
Automobiles, trucks, and parts OmittedIQ 1942 to IVQ 1945
Chemicals and explosives Omitted IIIQ 1942 to IVQ 1945
Ore and concentrates Omitted IIIQ 1942 to IVQ 1942
Manufactures and miscellaneousAddedIVQ 1942 to IVQ 1945
The "actual" figures for corresponding a year earlier are similarly
affected. To make the actual comparable with the estimated, or the figures for
one year comparable with those for another, we have made appropriate de-
ductions whenever necessary.
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pute the average error. If the estimate is 140 per cent of the actual
in one quarter and 70 per cent of the actual in another, the average
error would be (40 + 80) ÷ 2 or 35 per cent. On the other hand,
an error may be a matter of indifference to the user to the extent
that it is matched later by an opposite error. If that is the situation,
one should give regard to signs, and the• average error in the ex-
ample just cited would be (40 —80)2or 5 per cent. In my judg-
ment the first situation is the more important one. In the ninety-ninc
forecasts the national estimate for all commodities in the forecasts
had an average error, ignoring signs, of 7.51 per cent.
The average error, ignoring signs, in the national estimates for
every commodity that contributed over 5 per cent of the total actual
loadings in 1949 is shown in table 1. Although flour and meal con-
TABLE 1
Carloadings, by Major Commodities: Relative Importance in 1949,
and Average Error of Forecast, Neglecting Signs,










Grain 1,614 5.90 10.48








Ore and concentrates 2,228 8.14 25.80b
Gravel, sand, and stone 2,279 8.32 13.01
Lumber and forest products







Iron and steel 1,803 6.59 15.32
All other 7,125 26.02 .
All commodities in forecast 27,377 100.00 7.51
a Toderive this figure we computed the difference, in each quarter, between
the percentage ratio of estimated to actual carloadings for that quarter and
100; then we added the differences for all quarters, neglecting signs, and
divided the total by 99, except in the case of ore.
b Average for 95 quarters; no data for 4.
Source:AmericanRailroad Association, Car Service Division, National Fore-
cast.
tributedsomewhat less than 5 per cent, this catcgory is also shown
because it provides an instructive contrast with the others. The pro-
duction of and traffic in some commodities—ore and concentrates;
gravel, sand, and stone; iron and steel—fluctuate severely during the
course of business cycles The average errors in the estimates of these
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commodities were large. For lumber and forest products the average
error is also rather large; if the group included only structural lumber,
the average would probably be larger. On the other hand, petroleum
and its products and flour and other mill products are not subject
to severe cyclical fluctuations, and these commodities have the
best forecasting records. Grain is not greatly affected in business
cycle disturbances, but it is influenced by weather conditions, and
production and traffic are more variable than they are in the case
of flour and meal. Correspondingly, the forecasts for grain are less
accurate than those for its products.
The greater difficulty in forecasting the more variable commodi-
ties affects the overall accuracy record of the several Advisory
Boards (table 2). The Northwest board had the highest average
TABLE 2
Carloadings, by Districts: Relative Importance in 1949 and Average Error,





Percentage Amount Per Cent









10.Central Western 1,050 8.84 8.13
2.Great Lakes 2,061 7.53 12.58
1.Midwest 3,244 11.85 6.66
12. New England 458 1.67 8.34
3.Northwest 2,064 7.54 13.78
4.Ohio Valley 3,155 11,52 10.37
11.Pacific Coast 1,332 4.87 • 10.14
14.Pacific Northwest 943 3.44 8.18
6.Southeast 3,367 12.30 9.63
7.Southwest 1,954 7.14 9.99
5.Trans-Missouri-Kansas 1,510 5.52 7.32
United States 27,377 100.00 7.51a
a Theaverage error for the country is lower than the average error for almost
every district because the district errors cancel each other to some extent in the
national average.
Source: See source for table 1. For boundaries of districts see map in any
issue of the National Forecast.
error, and the Great Lakes and Allegheny errors were oniy a little
smaller. District 3 (Northwest) includes the Minnesota ranges of
iron ore deposits, and loadings of ore and concentrates are a very
large part of its loadings. District 2 (Great Lakes) includes the Lake
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Erie ports at which ore going to interior furnaces is transferred from
•vessels to cars, and ore loadings are relatively important in this dis-
trict also. District 9 includes the Pittsburgh steel-mak-
ing area, and iron and steel loadings are a relatively large part of
its total.
The direction of the error appears to be related to business con-
ditions. The unshaded periods on chart 1 correspond roughly to
business expansions, and the shaded periods correspond to business
contractions. A cursory glance at the chart suggests that the fore-
casts tend to fall short of the actual in expansions and to exceed the
actual in contractions. The men on the committees that make these
forecasts are representatives of business enterprises. It looks as
though businessmen tended to underestimate the force both of ex-
pansions and of contractions. When business is improving they are
underoptimistic; when it is falling off they are underpessimistic.
We may check this visual impression by computing average errors
for business expansions and contractions separately. For this pur-
pose we must consider the sign of the error. If businessmen tend
to underestimate their prospects in expansion, underestimates should
be more common than overestimates, and the average error, signs
considered, should be negative in periods of expansion. If business-
men tend to overestimate their prospects in contractions, the aver-
age error, signs considered, should be positive in periods of con-
traction. Our computations support the general impression described
in the preceding paragraph, although not as strongly as they might
(table 3, part A). The error was negative in two of four expansions,
positive in all contractions. The two expansions in which it was
positive (1927-1929 and 1945-1948) were much milder than the
other two (1933-1937 and 1938-1945). The positive error in 1927-
1929 was much smaller than that in the immediately following
contraction, and the same is true of the positive error in 1945-1948.
Instead of comparing the error during expansions in general busi-
ness with the error in contractions of general business, we may com-
pare the error during expansions of the traffic under consideration
with the error during contractions of that traffic. To accomplish this
we must first identify the cycles in traffic. Accordingly, we have
adjusted the actual figures (all commodities in forecast) for seasonal
variation, and marked off peaks and troughs as boundaries for the
traffic expansions and contractions (chart 2). All the business fluctu-
ations except 1926-1927 and 1927-1929 had their analogues in
traffic, although the boundary dates for traffic differ somewhat from
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TABLE 3
Percentage Error, Estimated Carloadings Compared with Actual
in Same Quarter, during Periods of Expansion and Contraction













IVQ 1927 IIQ 1929 Expansion 6.03
IIQ 1929 IQ 1933 Contraction 16.10
IQ 1933 IIQ 1937 Expansion —3.35
IIQ 1937 IIQ 1938 Contraction 12.80
IIQ 1938 IQ 1945 Expansion —1.08
IQ 1945 IVQ 1945 Contraction 1.27
IVQ 1945 IVQ 1948 Expansion 1.36






IIIQ 1929 IIIQ 1932 Rapid contraction 18.01
IIIQ 1982 IIQ 1937 Expansion —1.87
IIQ 1937 IIQ 1988 Contraction 12.80
IIQ 1938 IQ 1944 Expansion —1.14
IQ 1944 IIQ 1946 Contraction 1.28
IIQ 1946 IQ 1947 Expansion 1.28
IQ 1947 IVQ 1948 Slow contraction 0.47
1VQ 1948 IVQ 1949 Rapid contraction 12.85
a Datesare inclusive. In computing averages for each period an overlapping
quarter (e.g. IIQ 1929 on first and second lines) was considered half a
quarter, and half of its error was included in the total for the period. The 1927
and 1949 turning quarters are so treated, except that, under "traffic cycles,"
IIIQ 1927 was included in full.
b Based on "reference" chronology of National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: See source for table 1.
those for business. There is even a little evidence of a contraction
in traffic corresponding to 1926-1927 in business and an expansion
corresponding to 1927-1929, but it is so faint that we ignore it. The
general trend of traffic was downward in 1926-1929, but the decline
was much less abrupt than in 1929-1932. The third quarter of 1929
looks like a point of inflection; we shall subdivide 1926-1932 at that
point. Although traffic reached a peak in the first quarter of 1947,
the decline from that quarter to the quarter of the business peak
was very mild. We shall subdivide 1947-1949 also.
This approach suggests a conclusion similar to that suggested by
the business cycle approach, and troubled by fewer exceptions
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irregular decline of 1926-1929 (or at least in that part of it for which
we have forecasts) and in the sharper decline thatfollowed. It was
smaller in the period of gradual than in the period of severe de-
cline. Similar remarks apply to 1947-1949 and its component periods.
All periods except 1946-1947 obey the rule that the average is nega-
tive in expansion and positive in contraction. Businessmen under-
estimate their prospective shipments when traffic in the aggregate is
growing and overestimate them when it is falling off.3
Change from Preceding Year or Quarter
The form in which the National Foreca.st is published suggests
that the commodity committees take as their point of departure the
loadings in the quarter of the previous year corresponding to the
quarter to be forecast, and ask themselves what the change from
that point of departure is likely to be. We may vary our statistical
procedure to take account of this possibility. Hitherto we have
compared the forecast for each quarter with the actual for that
same quarter. We shall now compare (a) the ratio of the forecast
for each quarter to actual traffic in the corresponding quarter of the
previous year with (b) the ratio of actual traffic in the forecast
quarter to actual traffic in the corresponding quarter of the previous
year.
First let us look at the direction of change (chart 8). In both the
estimated and the actual change there are large runs of quarters
in which the direction of change is positive, and others in which it
is negative. In a broad way the runs correspond to business cycles.
On the chart there is a white stretch corresponding roughly to the
business expansion of 1927-1929, a shaded stretch corresponding to
the business contraction of 1929-1983, and so forth. Usually the esti-
mated direction of change is the same as the actual direction. The
frequent agreement may seem impressive atfirst thought, but
equally impressive success could have been attained in a much
simpler way, without any investigation of the traffic situation in
the various quarters. A "forecast" could have been made at the be-
ginning of each quarter by assuming that the most recent direction
8Theexceptional average for 1946-1947 is positive only because of the large
overestimate in the second quarter of 1946; all the other quarters were under-
estimated. Figures for individual commodities indicate that the single over-
estimate is explained largely by failure of coal shippers to anticipate the effect
of the miners' strike that began on April 2 and continued (with a partial inter-
ruption) through May 29, 1946.
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Chart 3. Carloadings: Direction of Change from Same Quarter in Preceding
Year, Estimated and Actual, Third Quarter 1927—First Quarter 1952
of change would be repeated. A forecaster working on that assump-
tionat the beginning of the second quarter of 1981, for example,
would have noted that carloadings were smaller in the first quarter
of 1931 than in the first quarter of 1930. He would then have
"predicted" that carloadings would be lower in the second quarter
of 1931 than in the second of 1930. Such forecasts would have been
right most of the time. They would go wrong whenever the direc-
tion of traffic changes, and only then. The occasions on which they
would have been in error are indicated by the transitions from shad-
ing to white in the "actual" bar of the chart. There are fourteen
transitions.
On the other hand, the forecasts of the Advisory Boards were
wrong as to direction in every quarter that has white in the upper
and shading in the lower bar, or vice versa—i.e. in twenty quarters.
These twenty errors include several failures to anticipate major
cyclical downturns and upturns—the shifts from increase to decrease
in the fourth quarter of 1929, from decrease to increase in the see-
872
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ond quarter of 1983, from increase to decrease in the fourth quarter
of 1937 and again in the fourth quarter of 1948.
Now let us compare the estimated and actual changes quantita-










Percentage Ratios of Estimated and Actual Carloadings in Each
to Actual Carloadings in Corresponding Quarter of Preceding Year,
0
The location of a point from left to right depends on the ratio of
actual traffic in the quarter to actual traffic in the preceding year's
base quarter. Its vertical position indicates the ratio of the forecast
for the quarter to actual. traffic in the base quarter. If all the fore-
casts were perfect, all dots would fall on the line drawn at an angle
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a broad way there is a correlation between forecast and actual
change. The estimated change, however, usually understates the
actual, especially when the latter is large. Most of the dots in the
upper right quadrant of the chart are under the 45-degree line. Al-
most all of those in the lower left quadrant are above it.
Although perhaps not so intended, the estimate for each quarter
could be' taken as an indicator of the percentage change to be ex-
pected from the immediately preceding quarter. We can compute
the error that would attend such expectations by a method similar
to that just employed. For example, we can compare (a) the ratio
of the forecast for the fourth quarter of 1949 to the actual traffic in
the third quarter of 1949 with (b) the ratio of the actual traffic in
the fourth quarter to the actual in the third quarter. In this kind of
comparison the change is largely influenced by seasonal factors.
The usual pattern is a rise from the first to the second and frpm the
second to the third quarters, a fall from the third to the fourth and
from the fourth to the first. In all 99 quarters the direction of change
from actual to actual departed from this seasonal pattern in 11 in-
stances. The forecast missed 7 of these exceptions. It erroneously
indicated departures from the seasonal pattern in 11 instances, mak-
ing 18 errors in all.
Quantitatively, the relation between estimated and actual change
from the preceding quarter was much looser than the relation be-
tween estimated and actual change from the preceding year. Chart
5 suggests less correlation than chart 4.
Simple Seasonal Method Gives Better Forecasts
The preceding discussion suggests that much of the error in the
estimates results from failure to gauge correctly the amount, or even
the direction, of cyclical change, and that the accumulated cyclical
change overyear, rather than the seasonal variation from quarter
to dominates them. Estimates could be made, instead, on
the simple assumption that the usual seasonal change from the most
recent quarter will occur. Might such a procedure yield forecasts
that are just as accurate?
If a forecast for a third quarter in a particular year. is desired, for
example, one might examine the actual carloadings in the second
and third quarters of the preceding five years, compute the average
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Actual
140
Chart 5. Percentage Ratios of Estimated
Quarter to Actual Carloadings in Preceding
and Acbiai Carloádings in Each
Quarter, 1927-1952
in the second quarter of the current year by this ratio to obtain the
desired estimate for the third quarter. Table 4 illustrates how such
a forecast could have been made for the third quarter of 1937. From
the second to the third quarter, carloadings increased 6.2 per cent
in 1932, 25.5 per cent in 1933, and so forth. The average increase
was 11.0 per cent. A forecaster using this purely seasonal method
would have assumed that carloadings in the third quarter of 1937
would be 111.0 per cent of carloadings in the second quarter of
that year.
We have made an estimate by the method of table 4 for each of
the ninety-nine quarters, using in each case a seasonal ratio freshly
computed from data for the appropriate five pairs of earlier quar-
375
70 80 90 100 110 120 130FORECASTS OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
TABLE 4
Estimate, by Seasonal Method, of Carloadings
In Third Quarter of 1937
(thousands of cars)
A. Seasonal Experience of Preceding Years
Actual Carloadings
. Ratio of
Second Third Third Quarter
Quarter Quarter to Second
1932 3,618 3,842 1.062
1933 3,946 4,951 1.255
1934 4,603 4,812 1.045
1935 4,552 4,784 1.051
1936 5,331 6,058 1.136
B. Computation of Estimate and Error. .
Average of five ratios above
Actual carloadings, second quarter of 1937




Cars actually loaded, third quarter of 1937
Ratio' of estimate to actual, 6,7278,413
6,413
1.049
- Percentageerror of estimate 4.92
Source: See source for table 1..
ters. For all traffic in the aggregate, the seasonal method gives some-
what better results than those achieved by the Advisory Boards.
The mean error, neglecting signs, of the ninety-nine by
the seasonal method is 6.47 per cent. It will be recalled that the
mean error of' the Advisory Board forecasts is 7.51 per cent.
If this method were to be used in making current forecasts rather
than retrospective ones, data on actual carloadings in the quarter
just closed would have to be available at the beginning of each
quarter to be forecast. At the beginning of the first quarter of
1955 the forecasting. agency would have to know the carloadings in
the fourth quarter of 1954. This should be feasible. Carloadings for
the nation are compiled daily and are among the most promptly
available of all economic data.
Our "forecasts," therefore, although they were made long after
the event to be "predicted" had occurred, make use only of in-
formation that could have been available in advance. All of the data
underlying the estimate in table 4, for example, were or could have
been available at the beginning of the third quarter of 1937.
An agency with resources not at our disposal could have followedFORECASTS OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
a somewhat superior technical procedure. In "forecasting" the third
quarter of 1927 and subsequent quarters in the earlier years of our
period we needed seasonal ratios jased on actual carloadings prior
to July 1926. There are no data for traffic before that date com-
parable with the traffic data included in the forecasts. We therefore
used the Interstate Commerce Commission data on cars of carload
traffic originated. If the shippers and the Car Service Division had
used the seasonal method in 1927, they presumably could have ob-
tained strictly comparable historical data from the railroads. In
spite of the discrepancy in character between the ICC figures and
the figures to be estimated, however, the earlier "forecasts" by the
seasonal method are not notably worse than the later ones (chart 1).
We have derived our seasonal ratios directly from the total car-
loadings of all commodities. A better forecast might be obtained,
at the cost of much greater computational effort, by applying sep-
arate seasonal adjustment factors to each of the major commodities
and adding the estimates for the, various commodities. Such a
method would take account of changes in the relative importance
from year to year of commodities with different seasonal features.4
In spite of possible improvements, however, I do not contend
that seasonal adjustment gives good forecasts. The point is merely
that a simple, mechanical procedure yields estimates of total traffic
that are somewhat less erroneous, on the average, than the esti-
mates obtained by the elaborate Advisory Board procedure.
Forecasts based on nothing but seasonal fluctuation obviously
make no allowance for other than seasonal influences on carload-
ings—no allowance for the business cycles or for occasional incidents
like a major coal strike. The seasonal-method estimates, like the Ad-
visory Board estimates, tend to be too low in expansions and too
high in contractions (chart 1). But the seasonal forecasts are at least
as good as the Advisory Board forecasts. The latter, too, do not suc-
cessfully anticipate the effect of cyclical and other influences.
ForecastsinICC Proceedings
In recent years rising wage rates and prices of materials and
supplies have forced the railroads to seek higher rates and fares.
4We computed the seasonally adjusted data in chart 2 by the commonly
used ratio-to-centered-moving-average method, using one set of seasonal indexes
for 1927-1931, another for 1932-1940, and a third for The method
is more sophisticated than the one in table 4, but its application to continuously
shifting base periods would involve much labor.
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Their efforts led to Interstate Commerce Commission investigations
in which it became more or less customary to introduce estimates of
traffic, which are regarded as relevant because heavier traffic is
usually expected to have a beneficial effect on net earnings and
hence to minimize the need for higher rates. rn these ICC proceed-
ings it is to the interest of the railways that traffic should
appear to be small, and it is to the interest of their opponents that
it should appear to be large.
Insofar as these estimates are cited in the Commission's decisions,
they are summarized in table 5. The nonrailroad estimates, except
the Commission's own on the last line, were introduced in opposi-
tion to rate increases. Many of the estimates pertain to the year in
which they were submitted; when they were made late in that year,
actual figures for the early months were available, and only the
remainder had to be guessed. Similar estimates of passenger traffic,
although of parenthetical interest here, are shown in the table.
In general but with some exceptions, the estimates that must
include some actual data look best, and the estimates made more
than a year ahead have errors that are large in comparison with
actual cyclical fluctuation from year to year. The former would not
look as good as they do if we could compare the implicit estimate
for the remainder period with the actual traffic for that period.
General Remarks
Traffic depends on the production (and in some degree on the
importation) of commodities and on the extent to which production
is disposed of locally, temporarily by storage or permanently by
consumption. The traffic of any one means of transport, such as
railroads, depends also on the changing competitive attractiveness
of the various means. Production, inventories at points of shipment,
and railway participation in movement all vary cyclically and for
seasonal and other reasons. Unless or until it becomes possible to
forecast cycles in production, it might be better, in quarter to quar-
ter forecasts, to disregard. the cyclical aspect of the problem and
concentrate on the seasonal influences, which are usually more
powerful in the short run, at least in their effect on total traffic. Even
with seasonal adjustment of the usual kind, the estimator will run
into trouble unless be can anticipate such developments as strikes,
unusually heavy or light crop yields, and early or late opening or
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important iron ore traffic is closely geared to the water movement).
The legalization of alcoholic liquors increased the percentage of
certain grains moving by railroad; "institutional" factors should be
watched. On the other hand, unexpected changes sometimes com-
pensate each other at least in part. When crops of grain are large,
farmers are likely to store a larger percentage in their barns or in
local elevators, or to feed a larger percentage to livestock; unex-
pected fluctuations in yield are then partly compensated by unex-
pected fluctuations in local disposal. But even if all these miscel-
laneous influences can be dealt with or shown to be of small net
importance in their effect on the grand aggregate of traffic, and
even if the safest way to treat business cycles, in our ignorance, may
be to disregard them, cyclical change will continue to confound
anticipations of traffic. The problem of forecasting freight move-
ments is bound up with that of forecasting the general course of the
economy.
380